My name is Michael DeKort.
I was the relator in the case against the USCG Deepwater contractors for the same 123 patrol boats. (Case 3:06-cv-01792-O)
I
have reviewed your complaint against Bollinger, have compared it to the
documents filed in our case and would like to suggest you consider
using the information below in your response. I am fully aware that you
have all of the discovery from our case, that I am not an attorney, you
are aware of many things about both cases that I am not, you have been
unhappy with certain aspects of my whistle blowing crusade and are more
than intelligent and capable. Having said that I have no doubt you have
an extremely large work load, there is a lot of data to plow through and
sometimes the best of us might miss something here and there. On the
off chance that I can be of any help I am hopeful that you will accept
the information below as an
earnest attempt on my part to try to help you hold Bollinger
accountable for what they have done.
I would greatly appreciate your acknowledgement that the right people have seen this information.
If there is anything else I can do please let me know.
Invoice schedule for all of the 123s. It shows all of the milestone payments - scope, modelling, design, dry dock, construct, launch and delivery of all 123s. ALL Scope through design for all 123s was paid for under the Matagorda DTO. (I can provide the document if it would help). All payments after Design would be fraudulent.
DD-250s for each 123 especially Matagorda. The DD-250 is official Material and Inspection Report. ALL known issues have to be shown on it or attached. All sums for $ hold back are shown on the DD-250s. DD-250s show amounts paid. Since ship hull strength was known not to be adequate it should have been disclosed by Bollinger etc on DD-250s so proper payment could be withheld. Since it was not disclosed $ was paid when it should not have been. First DD-250 for Matagorda was $14M to cover engineering/design for all 49 123s. (I can provide the document if it would help)
When project bidding began Bollinger proposed the 110 hull lengthening to buy time to design and build the longer term 110 replacement - the FRCs. ELC, the engineers for the USCG, said it was a bad idea based on the Navy's 179 program. Bollinger said they were wrong and the hull extension would work.
Capt (will provide name) told me that Bollinger was finding far more corrosion than expected. He believes they became worried because of the scantling requirement. He believed they had not bid enough labor or steel to fix that much corrosion. (ELC had mentioned in writing - which we have in discovery- that ICGS/Bollinger should be doing more investigative work to check out the hull conditions. The USCG clearly said the ships were in very bad shape during the bid process as well as when the project began. We had this info in discovery). He believed that in order to save money Bollinger cut corners by not using the corrosion finding scanning equipment properly (scan patterns being too wide) and chose to use thinner steel than they should have.
Invoice schedule for all of the 123s. It shows all of the milestone payments - scope, modelling, design, dry dock, construct, launch and delivery of all 123s. ALL Scope through design for all 123s was paid for under the Matagorda DTO. (I can provide the document if it would help). All payments after Design would be fraudulent.
DD-250s for each 123 especially Matagorda. The DD-250 is official Material and Inspection Report. ALL known issues have to be shown on it or attached. All sums for $ hold back are shown on the DD-250s. DD-250s show amounts paid. Since ship hull strength was known not to be adequate it should have been disclosed by Bollinger etc on DD-250s so proper payment could be withheld. Since it was not disclosed $ was paid when it should not have been. First DD-250 for Matagorda was $14M to cover engineering/design for all 49 123s. (I can provide the document if it would help)
When project bidding began Bollinger proposed the 110 hull lengthening to buy time to design and build the longer term 110 replacement - the FRCs. ELC, the engineers for the USCG, said it was a bad idea based on the Navy's 179 program. Bollinger said they were wrong and the hull extension would work.
Capt (will provide name) told me that Bollinger was finding far more corrosion than expected. He believes they became worried because of the scantling requirement. He believed they had not bid enough labor or steel to fix that much corrosion. (ELC had mentioned in writing - which we have in discovery- that ICGS/Bollinger should be doing more investigative work to check out the hull conditions. The USCG clearly said the ships were in very bad shape during the bid process as well as when the project began. We had this info in discovery). He believed that in order to save money Bollinger cut corners by not using the corrosion finding scanning equipment properly (scan patterns being too wide) and chose to use thinner steel than they should have.
