Saturday, February 23, 2013

DoJ V Bollinger - Suggestions to respond to case dismissal

My name is Michael DeKort.

I was the relator in the case against the USCG Deepwater contractors for the same 123 patrol boats. (Case 3:06-cv-01792-O)

I have reviewed your complaint against Bollinger, have compared it to the documents filed in our case and would like to suggest you consider using the information below in your response.  I am fully aware that you have all of the discovery from our case, that I am not an attorney, you are aware of many things about both cases that I am not, you have been unhappy with certain aspects of my whistle blowing crusade and are more than intelligent and capable. Having said that I have no doubt you have an extremely large work load, there is a lot of data to plow through and sometimes the best of us might miss something here and there.  On the off chance that I can be of any help I am hopeful that you will accept the information below as an earnest attempt on my part to try to help you hold Bollinger accountable for what they have done.

I would greatly appreciate your acknowledgement that the right people have seen this information.

If there is anything else I can do please let me know.

 Invoice schedule for all of the 123s. It shows all of the milestone payments - scope, modelling, design, dry dock, construct, launch and delivery of all 123s. ALL Scope through design for all 123s was paid for under the Matagorda DTO. (I can provide the document if it would help). All payments after Design would be fraudulent.

DD-250s for each 123 especially Matagorda.  The DD-250 is official Material and Inspection Report. ALL known issues have to be shown on it or attached.  All sums for $ hold back are shown on the DD-250s. DD-250s show amounts paid.  Since ship hull strength was known not to be adequate it should have been disclosed by Bollinger etc on DD-250s so proper payment could be withheld. Since it was not disclosed $ was paid when it should not have been.  First DD-250 for Matagorda was $14M to cover engineering/design for all 49 123s. (I can provide the document if it would help)

When project bidding began Bollinger proposed the 110 hull lengthening to buy time to design and build the longer term 110 replacement - the FRCs.  ELC, the engineers for the USCG, said it was a bad idea based on the Navy's 179 program.  Bollinger said they were wrong and the hull extension would work.

Capt (will provide name) told me that Bollinger was finding far more corrosion than expected. He believes they became worried because of the scantling requirement. He believed they had not bid enough labor or steel to fix that much corrosion. (ELC had mentioned in writing - which we have in discovery- that ICGS/Bollinger should be doing more investigative work to check out the hull conditions. The USCG clearly said the ships were in very bad shape during the bid process as well as when the project began. We had this info in discovery). He believed that in order to save money Bollinger cut corners by not using the corrosion finding scanning equipment properly (scan patterns being too wide) and chose to use thinner steel than they should have.



Saturday, December 4, 2010

Coast Guard Deepwater obstructs lawsuit

Here is the article from Corporate Counsel
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202475676076&Whistleblower_Settles_Suit_Against_Lockheed_mdash_But_Now_the_Good_Guys_Are_In_the_Way

The following is more explanation than the article was able to provide

I have been off the blogs for a long time. That was out of respect for the process – in the hopes the good guys would do the right thing. Given the importance of the case, however, the facts need to be known. (And I welcome the Coast Guard responding as well)

Let me try to address some points here and tell you what the article did not.

FOIA is supplanted by discovery. Additionally many docs on both sides are covered by the confidentiality of Protective Orders and/or privileges or exemptions from production. Virtually all of what I write below can be researched in PACER – the nationwide database for lawsuit/court data. As such, everything I will discuss is in the public domain.

Coast Guard’s inexplicable obstruction of our legal efforts – a case which is asserted for the (majority) benefit of 1) the US and 2) a much more modest participation by me and my attorneys.

On Northrop Grumman’s 4th attempt to dismiss my “hull claims,” just days before trial and while we were discussing settlement, the judge entered an Order which stopped the settlement process. The Court believed that allegations of qui tam violations regarding the HM&E (hull structure and design defects) were based upon public disclosures by media and testimony at the April 18, 2007, Congressional Hearing of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, and that I had no previous awareness of those problems. But,my claims were not based upon public disclosures, so we filed a motion for the Court to reconsider the dismissal. Moreover, the Court had already denied the Northrop Grumman/ICGS motion on three previous occasions stating I may have know about some of the 123s buckling status from the public/press but there was no evidence I learned about the fraud from public sources.

NG apparently changed the judge’s mind by presenting evidence out of context. For example, they only partially quoting my deposition text so that it looked like I connected most or the key parts at my hearing on 4/18/2007, while the full quote reveals that I qualified my statements by pointing to the preparation and lead up to the hearing which were not public disclosures. At that hearing Rep Cummings stated this case should be referred to the DOJ and that the CG should get all of its money back. In addition to this I had misunderstood some questions at my deposition and provided answers that were not want I would want them to be if I had fully understood the question – this also helped NG confuse the Court. Lastly in 2009 I had provided a declaration where, in addition to writing a confusing key paragraph, I made some recollection errors, because of the passing of time [6 years], and I had been unaware at the time that there were two separate shaft issues that caused shaft misalignment. So the judge took what he saw and made a ruling. (We responded under great stress, as the Court also only gave us 2 days, rather than the normal 21 days, to respond to a motion for summary judgment).

Now why did we want the Coast Guard’s help? We had filed a response to NG’s motion which disclosed my full deposition text. But we also needed to confirm that I learned the key fraud links from USCG personnel well before the 4/18/2007 Congressional Hearing. So we simply needed brief declarations from former CG employees Anthony D’Armiento and Tom Hickman to confirm my pre-hearing knowledge of the buckling hulls and design flaws known to the USCG after its investigations. We have obtained, fortunately, one declaration from the Congressional Committee’s former Lead Investigator, which is mentioned in the article. The investigator completely confirms and supports our position on my knowledge of the hull and shaft issues well prior to the Congressional Hearing, which I helped him organize. I was actually the person who provided Mr. Foushee the name and contact data for the investigations lead hull witness, Mr. Scott Sampson. Mr. Foushee’s Declaration should, standing alone, make clear to the Court its erroneous ruling. As it is always best to gather as much supporting evidence as possible, we also reached out to Mr. D’Armiento and Mr. Hickman, Coast Guard personnel at the relevant timeframe, for additional clarifying declarations.

Tom Hickman, a former WPB-110 XO and CG marine engineer who worked on the Deepwater program volunteered, if the CG would consent, to give us his declaration revealing communications with me about the hull buckling and design defects. Mr. Hickman actually referred to the contractor’s improper performance in the strongest possible terms. These statements in the fall of 2006 helped me support my fraud claims. I actually located the individual, called him to confer and passed his contact data to the CG. Within a short amount of time the agency currently employing him cleared him to help, so long as the CG consented, since the declaration related to a timeframe when the Mr. Hickman was working for the CG. Curiously, although I had no problem locating or talking to the witness, the CG reported that they were having problems locating him. Plleeasse!

Well the CG played “communications excuses” for a couple of weeks, losing critical procedural days. All the while, we clearly explained how and where Mr. D’Armiento could be contacted. In addition we provided sample declaration text for the CG and/or Mr. D’Armiento to edit in order to speed the process along, and we did edit the declaration per the CG’s comments. We knew that the Court could rule at any time, and we wanted the Court to have the proper evidence before it. After weeks or promising assistance, as the procedural deadlines continued to run, the Coast Guard issued a letter saying they were not going to help. (I then sought assistance from the current and former Commandants and received no response.) The Coast Guard’s key (frivolous) reasons for their dramatic change of course is repeated in the article. One of the points was that they did not have enough time. Well they had over three weeks. The reason we did not send them the Touhy agreement earlier was that Mr. D’Armiento was working for the DCMA at the time, and we wanted to make sure we followed the appropriate process. We specifically asked the CG to help by telling us how it wanted to process to proceed. They did, and we followed their requests. For reasons unknown, they strung us along, feigning cooperation, with no actual intention of providing any of the declarations. They misled us and Senator Cantwell’s office by telling both of us they were trying to assist us in the process. The matter could have been completely resolved by the CG in a matter of days, not weeks. The witnesses had already confirmed the facts that we needed them to confirm. We provided the draft declarations. All they had to do was “markup” or accept the drafts.

False guarantees issues were discovered weeks after the formal discovery cutoff.

In the summer, weeks after the formal discovery cutoff, we were finally allowed [by the defendants] to take the oral depositions of the Corporate Representatives of Northrop Grumman We learned that the contractors had misled the CG at the time (September 28, 2001) that they submitted to the CG their formal proposal for the construction phase of the IDS contract. The contractors in the contractual documents represented that guarantees of ICGS’ performance had been 1) executed and 2) delivered to the CG. But the guarantees were never executed or delivered to the CG. The contractors’ documents also confirmed that the award of the IDS Phase 2 contract was conditioned on the contractors providing the guarantees to the CG. Everyone knew that without the guarantees being provided to the CG, ICGS would not be awarded the Deepwater Phase 2 contact. Nonetheless, no guarantees were ever executed and delivered to the CG, and the contractors knew that fact. So, reality is that the CG awarded a prime contract to ICGS, a new and unestablished entity with grossly insufficient capitalization ($400,000) for a multi-billion dollar contract. As I write, the CG has demanded (2007) the repayment by ICGS of the $96.1 million that was wasted on eight completely unseaworthy 123s, now destined to become “scrap” according to the CG witnesses. So, how effective or good are the promised, but non-existent, guarantees, since ICGS hasn’t repaid a “thin dime?” If a real guarantee had been in place, the CG could have demanded the contractors’ performance of their guarantees. But there is nothing in place. Even worse for the U.S., ICGS, according to the contractors’ official witnesses, couldn’t pay a mere $10 million judgment, because it only has about $6 million. The U.S. is screwed unless our claims are allowed to proceed on the hull issues and the false statements about the guarantees. The CG has no money back, and it has 8 crappy 123s that it can’t even give away because of the dangers of operating the 123s. It’s just awful, and I and my lawyers are the ones spending the money and time, making huge investments, to get the money back for the United States

The internal contract documents show that the Coast Guard was assured that ICGS was a Joint Venture of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, another representation that was, apparently false, since the contractors denied the Joint Venture in Court—no denial in their contract proposal or in the contract documents, not on the ICGS website, not in media releases—just in the Court. So, we are also trying to straighten out that issue.

We included the guarantee and joint venture claims in the parties’ pretrial order, but we also requested that we be allowed to amend the complaint as a result of some comments by the Court during a pretrial conference. We have additionally requested some assistance from the Coast Guard to help them overcome the non-existent guarantees and the denial by the contractors of the Joint Venture which is prominently proclaimed on the contract documents and ICGS website.

Go ahead, Google “Joint Venture and ICGS and Lockheed and Northrop,” and you decide whether the contractors represented that they were a Joint Venture as they claimed to the CG, or not a Joint Venture as they told our Judge. Yes, it is amazing. Even so, the CG has little interest in cooperating with us in order to recover the huge losses to the U.S. taxpayers.

Does the U.S. have deficit problems and shortage of taxpayer money for virtually every federal program, anyone? Can the U.S. afford to waste the money [$96.1 million or more] that the CG wasted on the eight crappy 123s that are unseaworthy? Can we really afford to the have the Coast Guard “turn its head” in order to accommodate the contractors; no doubt, a relationship far too friendly given the virtual refusal to hold the contractors accountable? And, why is the CG obstructing our very expensive efforts to help them? Go figure… Well, it’s impossible to rationalize all of the bad decisions that the CG has made during our legal process. If they aren’t going to make the contractors pay back the money, when are they going to demand that the contractors fix the 8 pieces of crap floating in the CG’s Baltimore yard?

Do you need more examples of the Coast Guard putting up completely inappropriate road blocks? The Coast Guard produced late in the discovery period large and corrupted, in material part, a critical document that was one of the most important documents in the case. That document had been possessed by all of the Defendants for years and could and should have been produced much earlier. We literally spent many hundreds of thousands of dollars and wasted critical time doing work that the CG had already done and compiled. After we pointed out we had found the document and how critical it was the Coast Guard tried to suppress it; they “clawed it back,” until we badgered them to withdraw their suppression of the document in the last week of discovery.

Lastly, for the trial, the key CG witness who had confirmed in his Declaration that the CG was misled by the contractors on the hull structure issues was properly subpoenaed. Yet, immediately before trial we learned that the CG, who knew he was the “key witness” on the major issues had assigned him immediately before trial to a patrol boat in the Pacific. The boat where the witness was transported was in parts unknown, according to the CG, and it had no communications ability to enable even a telephonic testimonial presentation. Yes, at the last minute, the key CG witness jerked away from the legal process, designed to recover the CG losses of almost $100 million, to the Pacific to parts literally unknown, and he was shockingly unavailable for trial. The Court was highly concerned and commented from the bench that if we could find precedent for his Court to Order the CG to produce, immediately, the witness in Dallas, he would take whatever action was necessary

Screw up, screw up, screw up. When will government ever be held accountable for this kind of misbehavior? Only Congress controls the purse strings, and if Congress won’t intervene to persuade the CG to cooperate with the process, a good outcome will be difficult—not impossible, but much more difficult than necessary.

The Coast Guard has helped us only when mandated by law and subpoenas or when doing so was not critical to us. And even when forced to help, like providing documentary discovery, they fought us that as demonstrated by using the “clawback” to suppress the availability of one of the most important pieces of evidence in the case. Incredible as it may sound, all of the contractors had possessed the same document for years!

Why would the Coast Guard do this? Difficult to justify, so it is difficult to speculate. However, let’s acknowledge that it doesn’t like my whistleblowing, nor me, personally, as their representatives have candidly stated. Second, I believe they are being politically pressured by “others.” You can speculate about who is influencing the wave of poor decisions that we have suffered. Third– they have no interest in the public being reminded of their past failings and now finding out about the fraudulent guarantees. Imagine the concerns of Congress, the IG and the press if they known that the whole contract was awarded on the basis of a false statement regarding the execution and delivery of [CG] mandated guarantees, never executed or delivered as represented.

In addition to the pathetic 123s debacle, this also means that at least the first 3 NSC’s are covered by a false, non-existent guarantee – and depending on the contract mechanism – maybe all of the rest of the NSCs. The Coast Guard just announced that it awarded the 4th NSC to NG in a contract outside of Deepwater. Was there a competition? Is that boat guaranteed? How do you offer and award a contract to a company who has treated the Coast Guard the way ICGS et al have done so far? The 123 debacle is open with no money returned for the hulls, and the CG was duped into signing the entire Phase 2 IDS contract when there was no executed and delivered guarantee as expressly represented by the contractors. In addition to the qui tam violations, is there is a FAR issue here? Senator Cantwell’s staff wonders, too.

I find it very unfortunate that the Coast Guard would be behaving this petty, vindictive and short sighted because of their animosity towards me and towards transparent governance. The CG knows that our case is their best shot at getting recovery of the refund for the boats losses and other losses arising from the contractors’ fraudulent inducement of the IDS contract. My attorneys have already committed millions of dollars in services and expenses in order to help the U.S./Cost Guard secure their refund.

The taxpayers shouldn’t continue to be plagued with the $96.1+ million in absolute waste. Who else speaks for the taxpayers? Taxpayers are going through enough hell. The government is reportedly considering more taxes, while the CG gives a basic [$96.1 million or more] free pass to non-performing contractors in our case. Given these hard times – with universal federal deficits as far as the eye can see, reported Coast Guard, budget shortages and this being a post 9/11 world, isn’t it right to do everything they can to help us help the taxpayers get a decent recovery? We requested only cooperation (attitude check) and a review and revision, if needed, of a couple one or two page documents/declarations– not any real work at all. Hours, not days. Hours, not weeks.

We are hopeful that the Court has enough evidence before it to come to the right decision, but it won’t be due to any assistance from the CG. We will pursue the right outcome, as we have pursued everything else in this case. Take the CG’s excuses with a grain of salt and check the record if you want to be sure that YOU are not misled.

Monday, August 31, 2009

Coast Guard acquisition in smoother waters

The Washington Technology article can be found here

http://washingtontechnology.com/Articles/2009/08/31/Policy-Coast-Guard.aspx?Page=4

My response

“Even so, there are lapses, and as of March, the Coast Guard had not met the goal of complete adherence to the acquisitions manual for all Deepwater assets, according to a July GAO report. Coast Guard officials agreed with GAO’s recommendations to follow the manual and raised no objection to those findings.”

In english this said that the CG didn’t used the MSAM as it should have and promised to on the EXACT program it was meant for – Deepwater.

“Congress is stepping up its oversight. The House passed legislation in July that would bar the Coast Guard from using private lead systems integrators. The Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee passed a separate authorization bill.”

This is misleading. The congress passed a bill sating that the CG could waive the reforms in the bill if it chose to do so and those waivers could be used on the Deepwater program – the same program that drove reforms. And the CG has stated the LSI’s would not go away until 2011. That is after all of the NSC contracts and I would imagine the OPC contracts are let. Basically this is all a smoke screen. There have been some worthwhile changes but most are only skin deep – there is no root cause fix here. (The NSC still have major security issues – issues that will be propagated on to the FRCs and OPCs unless the root causes are addressed) Lastly let me mention again that ICGS, LM and NG have not only not paid the $100M refund for the 123s but they blame the CG for the problems with the hulls and have suggested they may actually seek damages from the CG for canceling the 123 effort. The contractors still run this program from behind the scenes.

Is the Coast Guard Significantly Changing How It Manages Deepwater?

The POGO blog with comments from myself and even the Coast Guard can be found here
http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2009/08/is-the-coast-guard-significantly-changing-how-it-manages-deepwater.html

Earlier this month Nick Baumann at Mother Jones reported that the Coast Guard would no longer be using the services of the Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS)—a joint-venture of the government's top two defense contractors, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman—for its Deepwater modernization program. But it looks like the Coast Guard Acquisition Directorate still needs outside help. Alice Lipowicz at Washington Technology reports that the Coast Guard may be issuing requests for proposals (RFP) for as much as $650 million in program management, engineering, acquisition, and administrative services.

If it comes to fruition, this RFP would continue two troubling trends that have decreased accountability and transparency in contracting at the Department of Homeland Security: relying on contractors to provide inherently and/or core governmental functions, and, because the Coast Guard seeks to issue an indefinite-delivery, indefinite quantity contract, utilizing a risky contracting vehicle.

It's unclear if this really signifies the stated departure from the Lead Systems Integrator concept—the idea that previously drove management of the highly criticized program. While the Coast Guard struggles to restore discipline and accountability to the Deepwater program, these trends call for continued, careful agency and Congressional oversight.

My response

The LSI's didn't go anywhere and aren't going to until they choose to. They simply run things now from behind the scenes.

The bill the congress just passed gives the Coast Guard permission to waive the reforms should they deem it necessary on Deepwater. Keep in mind the reforms were created for and because of Deepwater.

The GAO has stated that the Coast Guard failed to use it's own new reforms, specifically adhering to the MSAM, on core Deepwater efforts.

The Coast Guard has stated the LSI's will not be completely gone until 2011. In that time the rest of the NSC contracts and probably the OPC contracts will be awarded. Also stopping the LSI's basically means ICGS goes away. Well - ICGS has no employees of their own. The employees were all Lockheed and Northrop. All the Coast Guard has to do to honor their shallow promise is to go right to the contractors and create some leadership figurehead positions to cover for those really pulling the strings.

ICGS, Lockheed and Northrop have stated that they will not only not pay the $100M refund for the 123s but that the Coast Guard is responsible for the hull problems, because they didn't operate or maintain them properly, and that they might actually be due damages from the Coast Guard because the project was stopped. Lastly the NSC still has major communications security issues that may never be fixed adequately and will most likely be pushed to other assets like the FRCs and OPCs. Why wouldn't the Coast Guard defend itself here and demand the refund before the contractors can bid on any more efforts and publicly state that the contractors are solely responsible for the 123 problems?

Yes some good things have been done over the past couple of years but they are skin deep at best. The root causes have not been addressed.

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

LSI's are really not gone

It appears, as I have stated all along, that the LSI's are not really gone.
A new Mother Jones article (http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/07/coast-guard-still-deepwater) and The Center for Public Integrity had this to say about the Coast Guard modernization bill that has been floating around congress for years.

"Part of that effort is a bill sponsored by Cummings that is nearing passage in the House. The new law would prevent the Coast Guard from using lead systems integrators to manage future contracting. But the legislation includes exceptions that cover much of Deepwater, and that program represents almost all of the Coast Guard's planned acquisitions for the near future.

Nick Schwellenbach of the Center for Public Integrity, a good-government nonprofit, says the new law is a half-step at best. "The legislation is fine and contains many of the 'best practices' that organizations such as [the Government Accountability Office] suggest," he says. "But if these practices don't apply to the Coast Guard's premier modernization program, what's the point?"

Exactly – what’s the point?

If the PR coming out of the Coast Guard is correct and they have contractually directed the LSI's stop in 2011 why would the congress feel the need to pull up short and give them an out for the Deepwater program? (Additionally stopping in 2011 is a ruse. Waiting that long means all of the NSCs and OPCs will probably be awarded. I wonder to whom?)

So the contractors are not only not going to refund the 123 money (from Northrop’s point of view this is because the Coast Guard didn’t operate and maintain the boats properly) and, according to Northrop, the contractors are planning to file a claim against the Coast Guard for the stopping the 123 project but they are going to hang around as the party actually in charge (from behind the scenes now) and bid on the rest of the NSCs and OPCs. (With the OPCs being the bulk of the Deepwater budget). How far are the congress, the DHS IG and the Coast Guard going to roll over for these guys? Makes you wonder why they want to or feel they have to.

Saturday, July 25, 2009

Open call for assistance in the Deepwater case

Within the next few months we will be fighting the motions to dismiss from Lockheed, Northrop and ICGS. If we lose this round the case is over. That means there will be no refund and the contractors will not be held accountable for the Deepwater problem.

(In addition to that Northrop has signaled that the companies actually intend to seek damages from the Coast Guard for stopping the program. Text from Northrop motion to dismiss the Bollinger suit states the following:
"Presumably, Lockheed Martin could seek compensation from the Coast Guard under the CDA for C4ISR equipment and information delivery delays, if any, caused by the government. As the prime contractor, ICGS, not NGSS or Bollinger, could best determine whether Lockheed Martin or NGSS could assert a CDA claim against the government for delays experienced in delivering equipment or information to Bollinger. ICGS could also sponsor such a claim against the Coast Guard on behalf of Lockheed Martin.")

Additionally one of the tactics Northrop is using is to blame the Coast Guard for the 123 problems. They state that the Coast Guard abused these boats, did not operate nor not maintain them properly. From the motion:
"The Coast Guard decision to decommission vessels does not lead to the inescapable conclusion that the defendants committed fraud. To the contrary, there is strong evidence suggesting that the 123 structural issues were attributable to the Coast Guard's operation of the vessels beyond their performance parameters and failure to maintain the structural integrity of the vessels, not any nonconformance with contract requirements.

This is an open call for assistance. We are asking for the Coast Guard and even contractor personnel who read these blogs to get involved. We feel there should actually be very little trouble winning this motion but given the importance and finality of the event we believe it is prudent to not take anything for granted. If there was ever a time to act to ensure the refund is paid and the contractors are held responsible this may be the last opportunity. Finally I am calling on the Commandant himself to make a public and service wide call for the men and women who serve in the Coast Guard to assist in our efforts.

Friday, July 24, 2009

ICGS parties to file suit agianst the Coast Guard over the 123s?

ICGS, Lockheed and Northrop not only don't plan to refund any of the 123 money but they are actually considering taking legal action to secure damages from the Coast Guard because they canceled the program. So not only does Northrop believe the Coast Guard is at fault for the 123 problems, due to their negligence in operating and maintaining the boats, but they believe they are owed compensation because the program was canceled. Again - how many of you involved in these issues are going to sit by and not get involved. If we were to lose the motions to dismiss process we are in now the refund will be lost and these contractors will sue the Coast Guard for damages.

http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2009/01/deepwater-problems-motivated-by-disinterested-malevolence.html

The link to the Northrop court filing that contains the following quote is embedded in the POGO blog. See the footnote on page 12.

"Presumably, Lockheed Martin could seek compensation from the Coast Guard under the CDA for C4ISR equipment and information delivery delays, if any, caused by the government. As the prime contractor, ICGS, not NGSS or Bollinger, could best determine whether Lockheed Martin or NGSS could assert a CDA claim against the government for delays experienced in delivering equipment or information to Bollinger. ICGS could also sponsor such a claim against the Coast Guard on behalf of Lockheed Martin."

Thursday, July 23, 2009

Northrop blames Coast Guard for 123 debacle

From the Northrop Motion to Dismiss our False Claims Act suit.

"The Coast Guard decision to decommission vessels does not
lead to the inescapable conclusion that the defendants committed fraud. To the contrary, there is strong evidence suggesting that the 123 structural issues were attributable to the Coast Guard's operation of the vessels beyond their performance parameters and failure to maintain the structural integrity of the vessels, not any nonconformance with contract requirements. Simply put, defendants fully complied with the 123 contract requirements.

This is the partner the Coast Guard is still supporting? The partner the Coast Guard is willing to cover for? (All three companies - Lockheed, Northrop and ICGS also state there can be no fraud because the Coast Guard knew about all of the problems and accepted the boats anyway. Keep in mind no refund has been paid to date and these contractors are still under contract to do most of the work they originally signed up to do and are in the running for the OPC - which is the bulk of the DW program)

This statement is in the spec for the boat

"The 123-Ft WPB scantling characteristics will provide structural integrity equivalent to, or in excess of the existing 110-Ft WPB. Any cutter structural member found to be less than ninety percent (90%) of the original nominal metal thickness as a result of the post arrival hull survey shall be replaced."

Looks to me like ICGS/NG knew exactly what they were getting in to, promised to upgrade all of the 110s, designed and fabricated a flawed solution, misrepresented the problem to the Coast Guard, collected their money and then looked for a way out. That way out is to blame the customer by saying the Coast Guard abused, mistreated and did not maintain these boats prior to the modification.

All of you people in the Coast Guard (and the contractors for that matter) who read these posts and defend the organization or the contractors pay close attention here. These companies have filed motions to dismiss our claims. If they win there will be no refund, no penalty and no accountability. Is that what you want?

Are there any persons out there willing to provide additional information so that justice will be done on the Deepwater boondoggle?



Tuesday, July 21, 2009

Taking Lockheed to Task on the F-22 and F-35 Programs

My attorney Sam Boyd has recently served Lockheed in the F-22 and F-35 False Claims act cases. Interesting that two more Lockheed whistle blowers would use the same attorney I am?

Today, partly as a result of our getting the word to the right people, the F-22 program was killed.

Here are some relevant links
http://www.f-16.net/news_article3635.html

http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/07/airforce_F22_lawsuit_070209/

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/21/AR2009072100135.html?hpid=moreheadlines

http://www.standard.net/live/news/178961/

POGO posts my latest Deepwater response

The link can be found here
http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2009/07/deepwater-whistleblower-time-to-tell-all.html

I have posted it before but they did a good job of tying in the relevant links

Tuesday, July 14, 2009

GAO slams CG - Sen Cantwell takes on the Commandant

From the hearing
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=35b1f525-607c-4290-8ce7-7660a9d7f8f1

Sen Cantwell asked the Commandant if there were any contracts that operated outside of the MSAM (procurement guidelines) and he said no. Then she raised the new GAO report (below) and said the GAO mentioned the FRC was done outside of the MSAM (as I stated above). The Commandant had no answer.- because he got caught - and needed to have the GAO rep next to him bail him out.

Sen Cantwell also asked about the SCIF. The Commandant said it was never planned for the NSC and was added after 9/11. When the Senator asked why the design for it was started so late the Commandant said the spaces were reserved and all they have to do is add equipment. It's a shame she didn't press him further. This is a massive oversimplification. Those spaces have to be very specially designed and can't be near things like cabling, A/C ducts etc. I am told the reason the SCIF is not done is because there was a major interior redesign which is nowhere near complete and that the CG agreed to add the SCIF to fund Lockheed for the other C4ISR work it said it was not contractually obligated to do. See below for more on this)

Also - Cantwell asked why the parent craft for the FRCs is $10m and the boat the CG bought is $50m (remember Marinette protested because theirs was cheaper among other things). The Commandant said it was shipyard issues and electronics. Cantwell didn't buy it (She also wondered why the CG would buy a boat the ABS said may not have a strong enough hull. Where have we had hull issues before?)

------------
There was a new GAO report out this week on the CG's management of Deepwater
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-682
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d09682high.pdf
From the report

"However, the Coast Guard has not applied the disciplined acquisition process to the FRC and the second increment of C4ISR, recent contract actions that will involve additional investments of taxpayer dollars over time. "

So - how was the FRC bid process fair and professional? There was enough there for the GAO and CG to refute Marinette's challenge - especially they had the cheaper bid? (Plus the ABS says the FRC parent craft's hull may not be strong enough). It also says the second increment of C4ISR was not done in a disciplined way. Well either was the first increment. So what will they fall back on - system of systems - and repeat the same problems.
They said use of subs in program management and engineering roles has gone up. Who supplies them? Lockheed? Northrop? L-3 (Lockheed)?
"Finally, in light of the sheer size and scope of the Deepwater Program and Congress’s role in providing funds, the Coast Guard’s budget submissions do not provide a complete picture of the planned costs of Deepwater assets that would help inform the decision-making process. "
Why would congress allow this?

Also there is a major increase of funding for C4ISR? Was this to pay Lockheed off? The CG paid for the SCIF under this. I was told that was a way to pay LM to do the TEMPEST work on the NSC that LM was refusing to do because they said it was out of scope on the 123s. (The specs clearly say it is in scope. Remember the DHS IG auditor told me the DHS IG got this wrong in their 123 report when they sided with LM) In order to get LM working on the NSC, very late in the program, the CG had to pay them and change scope to get them to do the work they were always signed up to do. If they didn't pay - no NSC and LM might out the CG for their part in the cover up.

Friday, June 26, 2009

Response to DHS IG report that undercuts lawsuit on behalf of the US government.

This whole thing has come full circle. When it started, I said in my YouTube video that I had an unbelievable story to tell. Now, it looks like I need to tape a sequel.
Of course, I know that follow-up comments will say that I am obsessed, off my rocker, or paranoid. At least, I’ll be able to sleep at night, knowing I didn’t back down when even the “good guys” took the wrong road and put their personal desires ahead of their country.
On May 29, the Homeland Security’s inspector general Richard Skinner presented his department’s “Letter Report: U.S. Coast Guard’s Plans to Improve Deepwater Accountability” to Commandant Thad W. Allen.* This report involves areas where the IG says the Coast Guard is justified in holding contractors Lockheed Martin and Northrup Grumman financially accountable for problems in the Deepwater program. While the report includes appropriate items, it also omits some--purposefully and glaringly.
Unfortunately, Skinner’s failures in this report have forced my hand. Now, I am forced to disclose information relative to these matters that I had previously agreed not to disclose. I am breaking my promise because individuals and organizations have obliterated the trust I had in them on behalf of our country. If I am pressed for names, I will provide them.
In the report, Skinner purposely failed to include refunds for the C4ISR systems the Coast Guard is entitled to recover. Instead, he transparently and boldly pins nearly everything on Northrop and completely omits any reference to the 123 C4ISR issues. These problems relate to safety and security problems, huge unjustified expenditures of money and massive cover up. This means it will be much harder for the government to recover the Coast Guard’s investments in Lockheed-Martin systems designs. Why would they do this?
I believe the report reveals a significant level of panic and desperation from the contractors and certain government officials, who are trying to cover up their roles in the ordeal. While the report appears to sabotage my federal lawsuit, which I filed to recover funds for the American people and to punish those who committed fraud (and more), it also emboldens me. It tells me that our case is very strong. It also tells me that the Coast Guard and the contractors are desperate to make this entire fiasco go away. Of course, we may have to treat some senior government officials as hostile witnesses to prove the cover up and fraud. So be it. They should not have betrayed their positions of trust.
The DHS IG report left out chronic, ongoing, long-term problems, which are far more damaging than those that have already been widely reported. These safety and security problems incurred huge, unjustified financial expenditures and were hidden under a massive cover up.
The C4ISR systems, particularly topside equipment, should have been listed in Skinner’s report. As proof of this, I have documentation that:
 On June 5, 2006, the Coast Guard sent a letter to ICGS adding non-conforming 123 C4ISR equipment to the refund list; an attachment listed dozens of items that did not conform because, in bad weather, they would disable critical communication and navigation systems.
 The Coast Guard asked for all eight of the 123s to be rejected in their entirety--the whole boat and everything on them. I have the invoices, contracts, and DD-250s (forms that documented nonconformities) that show that all of these boats were rejected in their entirety, and they asked for a return of the entire $66 million, including all of the design work for the 123s and all of the project implementation costs. This included the C4ISR systems.
 Lockheed Martin/ICGS released a press statement regarding these items saying that, at worst, they may owe $3m for those items (though they had said the related claims were “baseless” and had “no merit”)
 The DHS IG report released in January of 2007 states that the 123 topside equipment did not meet weather survivability specifications. Further, it said that ICGS purposefully withheld that information from the Coast Guard until the summer of 2005, after the Coast Guard paid for the eight 123s.

I also have documents to prove that Skinner's report should have listed refunds relative to TEMPEST. For example, this January 2007 DHS 123 report stated that it appeared the requirements relative to TEMPEST were not rigid enough for them to fault ICGS. But, when I questioned the DHS IG’s lead auditor about the errors and other relevant issues (such as the Ron Porter illegal waiver and the use of flawed classified systems that leaked classified information in Cuban waters) he told me that:
 they did not have enough time to work the case;
 they had missed key items like the ones I described;
 their conclusions were wrong;
 they were not permitted to work the case full-time, so they were basically forced to work on it at night;
 he agreed that their conclusion on the camera surveillance system not having to have 360-degree coverage was wrong as well.

He apologized to me. When I told him this gave ICGS cover and would effectively ensure the same problems on the NSC, he agreed that was a concern and said he would work to get it right. But, to this day, the DHS IG has not righted that wrong. The auditor was removed from the effort. I assume he tried his best and was driven away, by his superiors, from doing the right thing.
This spring, the lead investigator for Congressman Oberstar’s Transportation Committee told me he knew that the DHS IG had gotten those same areas wrong in their report--and that I had gotten it right. He confirmed what the DHS IG auditor told me and he said the auditor had also personally told him.
The investigator also told me about an episode on the bridge of one of the 123s the night before our 4/2007 hearing. He said the commandant confessed to the congressman present that he had not told the truth, had not been cooperative, and that he knew the issues existed. He apologized and promised to get it right from that point forward. Of course, this occurred while the most crucial bits of data the committee had requested from the Commandant filtered in just hours before the hearing. This after they were already weeks overdue.
What proof do I have? At this point, I will prove it legally, which will be devastating to some contractors and government officials. As we pursue our lawsuit, we will have to use government officials to establish that other government officials conspired to cover up the contractors’ fraud.
It is possible that the DHS IG knowingly failed to correct an official report, knowing they did not properly do their jobs and knowing they had reached the wrong conclusions that risked the nation’s security. But, possibly, the IG intentionally falsified the report, enabling contractors and the Coast Guard to commit fraud and risking the nation’s security. Either way, it leads to the same devastating results.
So, why would they do this?
A common reason prevails. It is the same reason why Lockheed did what they did, the same reason why Coast Guard leadership covered for them, the same reason why some members of Congress only put on a great dog-and-pony show. They all have to cover their poor performance.
Speaking specifically of the members of Congress, some positive things did result. While the congressional committees got attention for my issues--that may otherwise have been neglected--the root causes are still there, the LSI’s practice has not been changed by law, no one has been held accountable, no refund has been paid, and the NSC has huge problems. Taxpayers still have to pay hundreds of millions of dollars they should not have to. Since the Congress members pulled up short, the contractor’s involvement has only been modified slightly.
In court, we will demonstrate that rampant fraud was committed when the Coast Guard accepted and paid for the boats and systems. Of course, they were duped at the time (hence the fraud), but they righteously could have taken on the contractors at the right time. Instead, they squandered the opportunity when the light began to shine on their own performance. Instead of coming clean, they repeated the contractor’s party line that everything I said was baseless. Why? Because so much had gone wrong for so long they were afraid that they would lose their jobs, reputations, and program control. Senior people would have to answer for longstanding poor performance by their subordinates. High-level and age-old political alliances would be exposed. So they circled the wagons, all of them. As a result, the circling had to continue, as it will, on every ship they would make for 20 years.
When the DHS IG said I was right about the topside equipment and low-smoke cables, the CG changed course and requested refunds for those items. Then, the DHS IG got it wrong. When the IG negated my accusations about TEMPEST and the cameras, the contractors and Coast Guard jumped all over it, using this to cover and justify their actions, past and future.
Though the DHS IG was wrong, the Coast Guard and its contractors were forced to use the same basic designs going forward--on the NSC. Accepted or “waived” failures enabled ICGS to make the case that they met spec or that the spec came up short. Actually, ICGS was legally bound by the “system of systems” requirement to repeat designs on the ships that shared systems. Further, you don’t change what isn’t wrong. To keep up the fraudulent charade and avoid scrutiny, they couldn’t risk changing anything that wasn’t officially wrong. This is why the Coast Guard treated me like a pariah. Instead of thanking me for my help and using the opportunity to help themselves, they shunned me and said all my original claims were baseless. (It was later proven that I was correct and the Coast Guard and its contractors were wrong.) As a result, I doubt the Coast Guard will ever push for the refund. Unless Lockheed and Northrop volunteer to settle, the Coast Guard is not likely to push them. Their main focus now is to cover up their own incompetence and, then, their culpability in enabling the fraud. If they pushed, the contractors would protect themselves by pushing back--and outing the Coast Guard. They can’t afford to go that route.
What about the Department of Justice? Why wouldn’t they take the case and defer to us? Possibly, as in other cases, the DoJ simply does not have the manpower to push this case forward. I am told they can take only 25% of the justifiable cases they investigate. That said, other possibilities may be at work. Lockheed’s lead council is James Comey, a Justice Department “hero” and former deputy attorney general. Many people who used to work for him are still in the organization, and they have their own career aspirations. They would not want to ruffle his feathers.
I have a letter, hand-signed by Comey, who says the Coast Guard was informed about every issue and had no objections with the program. Of course, this was before the DHS IG said Lockheed purposefully withheld data, and before the Coast Guard asked for the refund. This letter, therefore, may demonstrate that council is ill informed, or less than competent, or, perhaps, it proves fraud. (For more, just wiki James Comey.)
Where does this leave us? I assume that these government agencies and individuals will be beyond frustrated with me. But I am beyond caring about them or that situation. My only focus is doing the right thing for the Coast Guard and the United States of America. And I eagerly await telling my story in the print media and in my book, where I will have room to reprint the documents that prove my case. From there, perhaps a documentary or movie? The synopsis: “Government officials and the world’s largest defense companies put the country at risk post-9/11, wasting hundred of millions--maybe billions--of taxpayer dollars, all to avoid admitting their mistakes.”
Unfortunately, I am the only party actively pushing for the refund and for contractor accountability. Frankly, it’s an awful lot for an American citizen to have to do, when all the people who have the power, resources, and responsibility to secure the country bow out--and ignore their promises to act according to the highest ethical standards.
I don’t expect them to be perfect. People, including myself, make honest mistakes all the time. The issue is intent. What did these people intend to do? What were their motivations? And what are the ramifications for those they serve--the citizens of this country? With conscious choice, they had the wrong intentions. For that, I will take them to task.
* See http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_09-75_Jun09.pdf.

Saturday, June 13, 2009

Lockheed and Northrop Gruman should be debarred

Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman should be debarred from bidding future Deepwater ship projects, like the OPC, until the refund and fraud issues are resolved and the NSC's classified communication systems are complete, the system thoroughly tested by an independent source that would report its findings back to congress and the events surrounding the funding of the effort to, include the SCIF, are look in to. (Given the large defense contractors are so integral to the nation’s security it may not be practical to debar the companies as a whole. Of course those companies know this. While that would send the strongest message, one that is certainly maybe the more practical option and the one that sends almost the same message is to debar people. There are several dozen engineering, program management, senior leadership and ethic personnel in these companies who are responsible for these problems. They personally profited from the shoddy workmanship and fraud that was perpetrated on this effort. As the companies would continue on without these people and the nation wouldn’t suffer a bit maybe all of these people should be fired and their 401k company contributions and pensions should be stripped. That might send the loudest and most practical message of all? In future blogs I may start listing the names of the personnel I am speaking about – all the way through to the CEOs and Board of Directors)

To date all the Coast Guard has said is that the future bidding will not include ICGS and may include parties outside of Lockheed and Northrop. Given the contractors have yet to resolve the $96m 123 refund issue, they are now facing charges of fraud filed on behalf of the US government and there are serious questions about the actual capability of the NSC to meet secure communications requirements I am calling for all of this to be cleared up in order for LM and NG to be allowed to bid on future ship projects. The contractors have not only taken no responsibility for the 123 issues but Lockheed for example - still maintains all of the issues were reviewed by their internal ethics process and there was absolutely no wrong doing.

Given these circumstances it is not enough to simply state that ICGS is no longer in the loop. That is a reuse. While it keeps Lockheed and Northrop from picking themselves it does not preclude the Coast Guard from picking them.

The contractors on Deepwater were given and paid for an unparalleled amount of trust on the effort and not only squandered it and profited from it but is put the nation in serious jeopardy post 9/11. As Lead System Integrator's they were asked to be trusted agents of the US government, the Coast Guard and the citizens of the United States after 9/11. The CG admitted it did not have the right expertise to run the program and more importantly they admitted they didn't have the expertise to figure out what needed to be done and eventually test the systems to see if they were acceptable. The contractors professed to be able to leverage world class talent and world class ethics to accomplish those tasks - all post 9/11. They were paid for that advertised capability and didn't deliver on either. They backed the CG in to a corner be not informing them of what was really going on until the program was so far down the road it would be almost impossible to stop. They held the Coast Guard and the country hostage. They took advantage of the Coast Guard's admitted lack of expertise and conned them into accepting systems they should not have. The contractors withheld important information and lied about what they did tell them in order to ensnare the Coast Guard. These contractors abused the trust of the nation. Their performance, refusal to accept responsibility and pay for their actions should be intolerable.

Wednesday, June 10, 2009

Keep the pressure up

Nice to see the new blog.

Keep the pressure up.

Latest articles

http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2009/05/is-tempest-testing-complete-.html

http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2009/05/22/deepwater-in-trouble-watchdog-says.aspx

http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2009/06/03/lockheed-fights-deepwater-suit.aspx

http://fcw.com/articles/2009/06/08/feat-blore-qa.aspx

http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2009/06/05/deepwater-whistleblower-has-a-conscience-attorney-says.aspx

http://washingtontechnology.com/blogs/editors-notebook/2009/06/coast-guard-defends-itself.aspx

http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2009/06/10/doj-looking-into-deepwater-false-claims-allegations.aspx

Tuesday, June 9, 2009

Colombian Drug Lords and DeepWater

It is nice to know that the senior leadership of the Coast Guard cares so little for the Coastguardsman under their command that instead of actually doing their job they would rather hand money over to someone who is legally on the same level as a Colombian drug lord.

They can't really blame the previous CG management on the problem either, as the current management was a staff member of the previous leadership, and while the currently leadership may be tasked with the clean-up, they also have to be held responsible for causing the problem in the first place.

You see the whole Deepwater 2001 - 2009+ program was more about politics and pork barrel spending and less about building boats that float and planes that fly.

How Many Convicted Felons Does it Take to Screw in a Lightbulb?

Here is the Coast Guard press announcement on the Deepwater DooDoo and the political patches they are putting on the program.
http://www.uscg.mil/top/downloads/video/DeepWaterNews.MPG
http://www.uscg.mil/top/downloads/video/DeepWaterNewsQA.MPG

By legal definition because Lockheed and in turn ICGS - Integrated Coast Guard Systems has a long criminal history, and they (according to the government) practiced a long term course of conduct and they qualify for the definition of "Organized Criminal Enterprise" as defined by the FBI and U.S. law (Chapter 11, 19, 37, and 15 of Title 18 of the United States Code). http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/glossary.htm

Note the following PARTIAL list of Lockheed criminal and civil convictions, fines, etc. Notice that many of them involved flat out fraud on the part of Lockheed, lying in official documents, using defective products, poor workmanship or services, and on , and on ad nauseam.

The real icing-on-the-cake that nobody seems to notice is that both Lockheed are Northrop are both criminal organizations, and both have repeatedly been found guilty of defrauding the government, bribery, blackmail, theft, filing false claims, etc. Here are some of the more notable cases, but between the two companies there are over 100 cases. The two companies came together to form ICGS (Integrated Coast Guard Systems) which acted as the front for the two companies (who both are convicted felons).

Given the two companies proven history of criminal fraud, of multiple serious felony convictions, and of dozens of civil cases of procurement fraud, and fraud regarding government contracts perhaps the Coast Guard should explain who got paid off to get the two companies this multi-billion dollar contract. Yeah, sure this is "an accident"... Yeah, and those 43 bases in Cuba have nothing to do with eavesdropping on Key West Miami, Tampa, and the entire south-east quadrant of the United States.

Here are several Federal cases that go to the heart of both companies being a criminal enterprise defined by law)

Northrop Grumman Defense $17,000,000 Pled Guilty, 2/27/1990
Allegedly falsified test results and falsely claimed that required tests had been performed on a navigational device manufactured for cruise missiles purchase by the Government. United States v Northrop, Docket #89-CR-303, US DC CD CA (Criminal) Taxpayers Against Fraud (TAF) Quarterly Review Volume 14 July 1998; Defense Contract Litigation Reporter 06/18/90; Defense Contracting: Contractor Claims for Legal Costs Associated with Stockholder Lawsuits, GAO/NSIAD-95-66 (July 1995)
Northrop Grumman--Grumman Defense $20,000 Pled Guilty, 3/16/1990
"Procurement Fraud" (Criminal) Defense Contracting: Contractor Claims for Legal Costs Associated with Stockholder Lawsuits, GAO/NSIAD-95-66 (July 1995)
Northrop Grumman--Litton Defense $3,900,000 Pled Guilty, 1/14/1994
Pled guilty to charges of "conspiracy to defraud the government, wire fraud and converting procurement data." (Criminal) Defense Contracting: Contractor Claims for Legal Costs Associated with Stockholder Lawsuits, GAO/NSIAD-95-66 (July 1995); Federal News Service 1/17/1994
Northrop Grumman--Litton (Systems Canada) Defense $8,882,700 Pled Guilty, 6/30/1999
Pled guilty to accusations of "concealment of commissions paid to consultants who helped obtain contracts to obtain military sales to foreign governments ... and LSL pleaded guilty to additional charges of mail fraud and causing a false statement to be made by the U.S." (Criminal) Senator Harkin and Representative DeFazio Press Release 06/07/00; Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General Press Release 07/01/99 - 07/15/99; US Attorneys Office CD CA Press Release 06/30/99 and 10/25/99; DOD IG Semiannual Report to Congress 04/01/99
Northrop Grumman--Litton (Applied Technology) Defense $8,881,900 Pled Guilty, 6/30/1999
Pled guilty to accusations of "concealment of commissions paid to consultants who helped obtain contracts to obtain military sales to foreign governments ... ." (Criminal) Senator Harkin and Representative DeFazio Press Release 06/07/00; Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General Press Release 07/01/99 - 07/15/99; US Attorneys Office CD CA Press Releases 06/30/99 and 10/25/99; DOD IG Semiannual Report to Congress 04/01/99
Lockheed Martin --Aeronautical Systems Defense $21,800,000 Pled Guilty, 1/27/1995
Allegations that Lockheed and its executives paid bribes to an official of the Egyptian government to sell C-130 aircraft to Egypt. United States v Lockheed, Suliman A. Nassar and Allen R. Love, Docket #94-CR-226-ALL, US DC ND GA (Criminal) Senator Harkin and Representative DeFazio Press Release 06/07/00; Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General Report of Investigation 07/02/92 (FOIA); Court Docket; US Dept of Commerce Anti-bribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
So both companies appear to have criminal convictions on fairly major issues, but they also have other convictions, or rather between the two of them they have around 100 criminal or civil convictions, some of which bear a strong similarity to the Deepwater fiasco.
The common thread in these cases are bribes, kickbacks, procurement fraud, lying to the government, cheating the public, espionage, abusing their employees, proving that they are not trust worthy, and so on ad nauseam. Yet, even with absolute proof of their criminal conduct, convictions of criminal conduct, admission of criminal conduct, and guilty pleas of criminal conduct they are still given billions of dollars of contracts (which they have a history of not being able to deliver).
Lockheed Martin --Lockheed Propulsion Company Environment $85,000,000 Settlement, 1/1/2001"The corporation is responding to three administrative orders issued by the California Regional Water Quality Control Board & in connection with its former facilities in Redlands, California." (Administrative) Lockheed Martin Fiscal Year 2001 Annual Report
Lockheed Martin Environment $67,000,000 Settlement, 8/1/1996"The settlement ... Resolved claims of personal injury and property damage asserted by the [1,300] residents [of Burbank, CA] and alleged to be related to environmental contamination ... ." (Civil) Lockheed Martin SEC 10-K FY1996
Lockheed Martin Environment $50,000,000 Superfund Cleanup Costs, 1/1/2000"The company has been responding to various consent decrees and orders relating to soil and regional groundwater contamination in the San Fernando Valley. & ." (Civil) Lockheed Martin Fiscal Year 2001 Annual Report
Lockheed Martin Financial $27,000,000 Settlement, 2/24/1994 (Lockheed lied?)"The jury found that Lockheed violated the federal securities laws by making false and misleading public statements about Lockheed's employee stock ownership plan." NL Industries v Lockheed, Docket #90-CV-1950 RMT (Bx), US DC CD CA (Civil) NL Industries SEC 10-K FY1993; Confirmed by Kirkland & Ellis Law Firm on 04/13/01
Lockheed Martin --Aeronautical Systems Defense $21,800,000 Pled Guilty, 1/27/1995 (bribes and kickbacks)Allegations that Lockheed and its executives paid bribes to an official of the Egyptian government to sell C-130 aircraft to Egypt. United States v Lockheed, Suliman A. Nassar and Allen R. Love, Docket #94-CR-226-ALL, US DC ND GA (Criminal) Senator Harkin and Representative DeFazio Press Release 06/07/00; Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General Report of Investigation 07/02/92 (FOIA); Court Docket; US Dept of Commerce Anti-bribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Lockheed Martin --Martin Marietta Labor $13,000,000 Settlement, 11/21/1996" claimed that Martin targeted its employees age 40 and over for a series of massive layoffs and forced retirements over a five-year period." (Civil) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Press Release 11/21/96
Lockheed Martin Defense $13,000,000 Fine, 6/13/2000 (nice to know that Lockheed defecates on U.S. national security)Allegedly "the information transferred [to the Chinese Government] was inappropriate ... and ... there was a serious problem here that information had the potential to be used to be applied to missile development." (Administrative) Consent Decree 06/13/00; State Department Press Briefing 06/14/00
Lockheed Martin --Federal Systems Other $12,800,000 Judgment Against Defendant, 11/27/2002"The jury found defendants liable for breach of contract and for substantial compensatory damages." Cable & Computer Technology Inc. v Lockheed Sanders; Lockheed Martin; and Lockheed Martin Federal Systems, Docket #97-CV-05315, US DC CD CA (Civil)
Lockheed Martin --Sanders Other $12,800,000 Judgment Against Defendant, 11/27/2002"The jury found defendants liable for breach of contract and for substantial compensatory damages." Cable & Computer Technology Inc. v Lockheed Sanders; Lockheed Martin; and Lockheed Martin Federal Systems, Docket #97-CV-05315, US DC CD CA (Civil) 52 Fed. Appx. 20; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24501 [Lexis legal document]
Lockheed Martin Other $10,500,000 Settlement, 3/13/2001"IBM's Federal Systems Division overcharged the FAA for rent on four office buildings. & . Lockheed Martin (which acquired IBM's Federal Systems Division) agreed to credit the FAA with $10,500,000, to be offset through future billings." (Administrative) Department of Transportation Inspector General Press Release 3/13/2001
Lockheed Martin --Electromechanical Systems Defense $500,200 (Fine/Penalty) $7,500,000 (Restitution) Judgment Against Defendant, 11/6/2000Allegedly "since at least 1989, EMS and its employees have defrauded the government by charging costs incurred on its commercial contracts to its contracts with the Navy ... ." United States v Comsat, Docket #96-CV-966, US DC MD FL (Civil) Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General Press Release 11/01/00 - 11/15/00; Department of Justice (DOJ) Press Release 01/16/99; Court Docket
Lockheed Martin --Control Systems Defense $7,870,177 Settlement, 1/12/1998"Defective Pricing" (Civil) Senator Harkin and Representative DeFazio Press Release 06/07/00
Lockheed Martin Defense $7,100,000 Settlement, 6/10/2003"Allegations that payments made by NASA to Lockheed Engineering Sciences Corporation were based upon false and fraudulent lease cost claims." (Civil) U.S. Department of Justice U.S. Attorney's Office Southern District of Texas News Release 06/10/2003
Lockheed Martin --Martin Marietta Defense $6,700,000 Settlement, 10/6/1993Allegedly "fraudulently overcharged the US on dozens of defense procurement contracts from 1979 through 1988." (Civil) US Attorney's Office District of MA Press Release 10/06/93
Lockheed Martin --Support Systems Defense $6,693,000 Settlement, 3/30/1994"The allegations include that LSSI [Lockheed Support Systems, Inc.] underpaid its service contract employees . & ." (Administrative) Memorandum from the Department of the Navy Office of General Counsel 11/21/1994
Lockheed Martin --Lockheed Defense $6,284,796 Settlement, 12/14/1994Alleged nondisclosure of information to the Air Force negotiators regarding Lockheeds realization factor for direct labor costs for manufacturing ... . (Civil) Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General Report of Investigation 01/11/96 (FOIA); Court Settlement Agreement 12/14/94
Lockheed Martin --Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory Labor $5,974,636 Judgment Against Defendant, 2/13/2002"Twenty-six plaintiffs, all over age forty, brought age discrimination suit after their employment was terminated ... ." Meacham v Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, Docket #97-CV-12, US DC ND NY; Quinn v Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, Docket #97-CV-45, US DC ND NY (Civil) The Times Union (Albany, NY) 10/13/00; Court Docket; West Federal Supplement (185 F.Supp.2d 193); Confirmed by US DC ND NY clerk on 05/16/01
Lockheed Martin Defense $5,300,000 Settlement, 12/23/1996 (just like the Deepwater Project)Settled "allegations it overcharged the DOD by deliberately bidding low to win a contract and then made up the shortfall by boosting research and development costs ... ." United States v Martin Marietta, Docket #L91-1853, US DC MD (Civil) Settlement Agreement 12/20/96; Department of Justice (DOJ) Press Release 12/23/96; Taxpayers Against Fraud (TAF) Quarterly Review Volume 8 January 1997
Lockheed Martin Environment $5,000,000 Settlement, 10/2/2000"... more than 300 Burbank residents ... claimed they suffered illness due to toxic pollution." Abel v Lockheed Martin, Docket #EC021023, CA Superior Court (Los Angeles) (Civil) Mealey's Pollution Liability Reporter November 2000
Lockheed Martin --Sanders Defense $5,000,000 Settlement, 5/1/2000"... case involving the defective pricing on US Navy contracts ... [which] appears to be a pattern of activity ... ." (Civil) Naval Criminal Investigative Service Press Release 01/15/00 - 06/15/00; Taxpayers Against Fraud (TAF) Quarterly Review Volume 19 July 2000
Lockheed Martin Defense $5,000,000 Fine, 9/1/1998A qui tam complaint alleged that Lockheed Martin Corporation mischarged the Government by directing costs incurred in a commercial venture to the Government. (Administrative) Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General Semiannual Report to Congress 04/01/98 - 09/30/98
Lockheed Martin --Naval Electronics & Surveillance Systems - Akron Defense $4,250,000 Settlement, 5/1/2000"Foreign Military Sales (FMS) funds were improperly used while performing on a FMS contract ... ." (Civil) Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General Press Release 05/01/00 - 05/15/00
Lockheed Martin Environment $3,700,000 Settlement, 10/5/1999(Civil) Redlands City Council Minutes 10/05/99
Lockheed Martin Environment $3,500,000 Superfund Cleanup Costs, 3/14/2000"... proposed decree provides for a cash payment of $3.5 million over 10 years from LMC to the USAF and clean up services for LMC [for contamination in] ... Jefferson Co., Colorado site." United States v Lockheed Martin, Docket #00-S-562, US DC CO; Docket #97-CV-4214, US DC CD CA (Civil) Department of Justice (DOJ) Press Release 04/13/00; Court Docket; Confirmed by DOJ Environmental Natural Resource Division (ENRD) on 06/26/01
Lockheed Martin --Martin Marietta Defense $3,100,000 Settlement, 9/18/2002"The government alleged that from 1987 through 1994, GE and Martin Marietta manufactured and delivered for installation in Hornet aircraft more than 1,300 Accelerometer Sensor Assemblies that did not comply with electromagnetic interference contractual requirements." United States v General Electric, 97-CV-255, US DC SD OH (Civil) Department of Justice Press Release 9/18/2002
Lockheed Martin Defense $3,000,000 Judgment Against Defendant, 1/27/1995Allegations that Lockheed and its executives paid bribes to an official of the Egyptian government to sell C-130 aircraft to Egypt. United States v Lockheed, Suliman A. Nassar and Allen R. Love, Docket #94-CR-226-ALL, US DC ND GA (Civil) Senator Harkin and Representative DeFazio Press Release 06/07/00; Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General Report of Investigation 07/02/92 (FOIA); Court Docket; US Dept of Commerce Anti-bribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Lockheed Martin --Martin Marietta Defense $2,252,501 Settlement, 12/20/1996"Procurement Fraud" (Civil) Senator Harkin and Representative DeFazio Press Release 06/07/00
Lockheed Martin --Tactical Systems Division Defense $2,122,603 Settlement, 8/1/2002"Allegations that the company submitted or caused to be submitted certain claims to the Navy that were false and fraudulent & " (Civil) Department of Justice Press Release 8/1/2002
Lockheed Martin --Loral Electronics Systems Defense $1,550,000 Settlement, 1/10/1995"Defective Pricing" (Civil) Senator Harkin and Representative DeFazio Press Release 06/07/00
Lockheed Martin Defense $1,500,000 Settlement, 7/27/1998Allegedly "mischarged in excess of $22 million ... by intentionally misclassifying leasehold improvements as rent in order that the ... costs could be reimbursed by the Government ... ." (Civil) Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General Report of Investigation 11/12/98 (FOIA)
Lockheed Martin Defense $1,407,834 Settlement, 1/23/2003"The lawsuit alleges that Loral wrongfully inflated estimated costs it was required to disclose during contract negotiations, resulting in an inflated contract price and false claims for payment under the contracts." United States v Lockheed Martin, 97-CV-767, US DC SD OH (Civil) Department of Justice Press Release 01/23/03
Lockheed Martin Environment $1,300,000 Fine, 5/2/2002"The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency today penalized Lockheed Martin & for failing to operate its pump and treat groundwater cleanup system at the Burbank area of the San Fernando Valley Superfund site at full capacity." (Administrative) Environmental Protection Agency Region 9 News Release 5/2/2002
Lockheed Martin --Martin Marietta Electronic Systems Defense $1,172,062 Settlement, 4/9/1996"Defective Pricing" (Civil) Senator Harkin and Representative DeFazio Press Release 06/07/00
Lockheed Martin Labor $1,045,000 Fine, 8/28/2000Accused of "... multiple violations of nuclear safety requirements ... ." (Administrative) Department of Energy (DOE) Press Release 08/28/00; Confirmed by DOE on 04/23/01
Lockheed Martin Defense $1,042,144 Settlement, 8/4/1992
"Procurement Fraud" (Civil) Defense Contracting: Contractor Claims for Legal Costs Associated with Stockholder Lawsuits, GAO/NSIAD-95-66 (July 1995)
Lockheed Martin --Comsat (Electromechanical Systems) Defense $1,000,000 Settlement, 8/27/2001"Electromechanical Systems, Inc., & have agreed to pay the United States $1 million to settle allegations related to contract fraud." United States v Comsat Corp., Docket #96-CV-966, US DC MD FL (Civil) Court Docket; Department of Justice Press Release 8/27/2001
Lockheed Martin --Martin Marietta Defense $752,000 Settlement, 4/22/1992"Procurement Fraud" (Civil) Defense Contracting: Contractor Claims for Legal Costs Associated with Stockholder Lawsuits, GAO/NSIAD-95-66 (July 1995)
Lockheed Martin Defense $639,641 Settlement, 4/30/1993"Procurement Fraud" (Civil) Defense Contracting: Contractor Claims for Legal Costs Associated with Stockholder Lawsuits, GAO/NSIAD-95-66 (July 1995)
Lockheed Martin Defense $530,000 Settlement, 4/22/2002"An investigation revealed that approximately 23 Lockheed employees working on the contract did not meet the minimum qualifications for their positions. Consequently, Lockheed charged and billed & a higher hourly rate for these employees than was allowed." (Administrative) Department of Defense Criminal Investigative Service Press Release 4/22/2002
Lockheed Martin --Randtron Systems Defense $500,000 Settlement, 10/18/1996
Settled claims that it didn't give the government relevant information that would have lowered the price of military contracts for radar antennas... (Civil) Department of Justice (DOJ) Press Release 10/18/96
Lockheed Martin --Michoud Space Systems Defense $450,000 Settlement, 10/1/2000"An investigation revealed LMMSS failed to fully report its use of Government-furnished equipment and facilities for commercial production of thermal protective products ... ." (Civil) Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General Press Release 10/01/00 - 10/15/00
Lockheed Martin Labor $250,000 Judgment Against Defendant, 10/17/2000Job Discrimination (Sex) Case Davey v Lockheed Martin, Docket #96-CV-2076, US DC CO; On Appeal 10th Circuit, Docket #00-1373 (Civil) Court Docket; General Docket US Court of Appeals 10th Circuit
Lockheed Martin --Idaho Technologies Labor $220,000 Fine, 8/20/1999"The $220,000 penalty to Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Company (LMITCO) covers problems with nuclear waste storage containers in addition to a number of other violations that took place over a period from 1995 to 1998." (Administrative) Department of Energy (DOE) News Release 08/20/99
Lockheed Martin --Aeronautical Systems Defense $202,500 Settlement, 7/14/1997"Lockheed facilities manager was [allegedly] involved in a scheme with ... an independent real estate appraiser ... to over-appraise the value of Lockheed executives homes during a ... relocation buyback program. (Civil) Senator Harkin and Representative DeFazio Press Release 06/07/00; Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General Report of Investigation 12/09/97 (FOIA)
Lockheed Martin --Federal Systems Defense $200,000 Settlement, 8/22/1996"... alleged failure ... of Lockheed ... to properly inspect, test, or remove residual salts from dip-brazed [aircraft-computer] parts ... ." United States v IBM, Docket #93-CV-1408 TJM/DNH, US DC ND NY (Civil) Settlement Agreement 08/22/96; Senator Harkin and Representative DeFazio Press Release 06/07/00
Lockheed Martin --Aeronautical Systems Defense $146,000 Settlement, 11/21/1995"Contractor Kickbacks" United States v Lockheed, Docket #93-CV-2167, US DC ND GA (Civil) Senator Harkin and Representative DeFazio Press Release 06/07/00; Court Docket; Confirmed by Department of Justice (DOJ) Public Affairs Office on 07/20/01
Lockheed Martin --Idaho Technologies Environment $130,175 Fine, 10/29/2001Allegedly "violating federal asbestos and chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) emissions laws." (Administrative) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 10 News Release 10/29/01
Lockheed Martin --Idaho Technologies Labor $125,000 Fine, 6/8/1998"The Department of Energy (DOE) has fined two contractors at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) for violations of nuclear safety rules that led to low-level radiation exposures to six workers in September 1997." (Administrative) Department of Energy (DOE) News Release 06/08/99
Lockheed Martin --Idaho Technologies Other $55,000 Fine, 9/24/1998"In October 1997, two reactor operators at the Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility in Idaho falsified records to indicate that the required testing of reactor safety systems had been performed, when in fact it had not." (Administrative) Department of Energy (DOE) News Release 09/24/98
Lockheed Martin Environment $45,000 Fine, 4/21/1997
Toxic Substances Control Act case. (Civil) Environmental Protection Agency Freedom of Information Act document
Lockheed Martin --Martin Marietta Other $45,000 Fine, 9/30/1997"Allegations that Martin Marietta exported graphic/epoxy prepreg material from the United States to South Korea, without obtaining the required validated export licenses." (Administrative) Department of Commerce News Release 9/30/1997; Settlement Agreement
Lockheed Martin --Energy Systems Environment $43,000 Fine, 4/21/1997Toxic Substances Control Act case. (Civil) Environmental Protection Agency Freedom of Information Act document
Lockheed Martin --Energy Systems Environment $22,500 Fine, 10/24/1996Resource Conservation and Recovery Act case. (Civil) Environmental Protection Agency Freedom of Information Act document
Lockheed Martin --Loral Federal Systems Defense $17,272 Settlement, 9/18/1996"Cost/Labor Mischarge" (Civil) Senator Harkin and Representative DeFazio Press Release 06/07/00
Lockheed Martin --Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory Environment $12,750 Fine, 7/2/1998... failing to notify the EPA promptly of releases of PCBs. (Administrative) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Press Release 07/02/98
Lockheed Martin --Lockheed Environment $6,000 Fine, 8/18/1994Clean Water Act case. (Administrative) Environmental Protection Agency Freedom of Information Act document
Lockheed Martin Environment $5,000 Fine, 11/2/2000Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act case. (Civil) Environmental Protection Agency Freedom of Information Act document
Lockheed Martin Environment $500 Fine, 3/13/1997Toxic Substances Control Act case. (Administrative) Environmental Protection Agency Freedom of Information Act document
Lockheed Martin Environment Part of $37,250,000 Superfund Cleanup Costs, 5/25/2000Lockheed will pay for drinking water aquifer restoration costs in the San Fernando Valley - one of the largest contaminated groundwater sites in California. (Administrative) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 9 Press Release 05/25/00
Lockheed Martin Labor Pending, 5/10/2000"... African-American employees charge that Lockheed harassed black workers [and] denied them deserved promotions or wages ... ." Reid v Lockheed Martin; Yarbrough v Lockheed Martin, Docket #00-CV-1182 & Docket #00-CV-1183, US DC ND GA (Civil) Court Docket; Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Press Release 12/05/00
Lockheed Martin Environment Pending, 6/28/2000"The [class action] suit alleges the companies didn't run the [Hanford Nuclear Reservation] plant safely and failed to inform the public of the health risks." Lumpkin v EI Dupont, Docket #00-CT-5052, US DC ED WA (Civil) Pittsburgh Post Gazette 07/12/00; Confirmed by Short, Cressman & Burgess Law Firm on 04/23/01
Lockheed Martin --Missions Systems Labor Pending, 7/13/2001Two employees were "allegedly subjected to sexual harassment and sex discrimination at Lockheed's facility in Albuquerque, New Mexico." (Civil) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Press Release 07/13/01; Court Complaint
Lockheed Martin Environment Part of $2,292,954 Superfund Cleanup Costs, 10/6/2000"... the United States sought recovery of the past costs it incurred with addressing the release ... of contaminants at the Vandale Junkyard Superfund Site in ... Ohio." United States v BF Goodrich, Docket #C2-97-366, US DC SD OH (Civil) Department of Justice (DOJ) Press Release 10/06/00; Consent Decree 07/17/00; Confirmed by DOJ on 06/27/01
Lockheed Martin --Space Systems Defense Pending, 4/5/2001Lockheed is allegedly "selling several buildings and associated land ... in effect considering the buildings to be worthless [but] proposals to charge government contracts with over $95 million in losses for the supposedly worthless buildings." (Administrative) Letter from Senator Tom Harkin to Diedra Hall, Director of Defense Procurement 04/05/01; Confirmed by Defense Contract Management Office on 06/28/01; Pending status confirmed by Senator Harkin's Office on 03/19/02
Lockheed Martin Environment Part of $12,145,000 Superfund Cleanup Costs, 11/23/1999Regarding "cleanup of the Pine Street Canal Superfund Site in Burlington, Vermont." United States v Green Mountain Power, Docket #99-CV-366, US DC VT (Civil) EPA Press Release 11/23/99; Confirmed by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 2 on 05/02/01
Lockheed Martin --Loral Defense Pending, 8/13/1996False Claims Act Lawsuit United States v Loral, Docket #96-CV-5554, US DC CD CA (Civil) Court Docket
Lockheed Martin --Tactical Systems Defense Pending, 5/5/1999 (who at the CG got a kickback?)"Ultimately, the contract was awarded to the winning bidder. Subsequently, it was revealed that the winning bidder offered bribes and sexual favors to key Korean officials. The losing bidder filed an action asserting claims under California's unfair competition law. ... ." Korea Supply Company v Lockheed Martin, Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four. Los Angeles County. B136410. No. BC 20893 (Civil) Supreme Court of California 29 Cal. 4th 1134; 63 P.3d 937; 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29; 2003 Cal. LEXIS 1301; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 1825; 2003 Daily Journal DAR 2291 (Lexis legal document)
Lockheed Martin --Energy Systems Environment Pending, 6/1/1999"Alleges that Energy Systems submitted false claims for millions of dollars while failing to store properly and dispose of radioactive and hazardous wastes." United States v. Lockheed Martin, Docket #5:99-CV-00170-M, US DC WD KY (Civil) Department of Justice Press Release 05/30/2003
Lockheed Martin --Sanders Environment Part of $626,000 Superfund Cleanup Costs, 7/11/2002"Administrative settlement for recovery of past response costs concerning the Angelillo Property Superfund site in Southington, Connecticut with the settling parties." (Civil) Federal Register 7/11/2002 (Vol.67,No.133) p.45978-45980
Lockheed Martin --Lockheed Missiles and Space Company Defense Pending, 1/8/1988Allegedly, "filed false claims for payments under several contracts with the federal government." United States v Lockheed Missiles and Space, Docket #88-CV-20009, US DC ND CA (Civil) Government Contract Litigation Reporter 03/23/00; Court Docket; Federal Contracts Report 03/29/99; Taxpayers Against Fraud (TAF) Quarterly Report Volume 11 October 1997, Volume 16 April 1999; Appeals Court Docket Summary
Lockheed Martin Defense Sealed Case Settlement, 9/19/2000"A C-130 Hercules was on a routine training mission ... when its four Allison T-56 turboprop engines failed, causing the aircraft to crash. The lawsuit alleged that Lockheed Martin was liable for the crash ... that took the lives of ten Air Force Reservists." Wellnitz v Lockheed Martin, Docket #97-CV-1648, US DC OR (Civil) Armed Forces Newswire Service 11/24/97; Court Docket; Confirmed by Tichenor & Dziuba Law Firm on 04/19/02
Lockheed Martin Labor Sealed Case Settlement, 3/1/1993Three former employees of Lockheed Corp ... claimed they had been dismissed after revealing faults in Lockheeds C5B cargo plane. Benecke v Lockheed, Docket #621967, Superior Court (Los Angeles County) (Civil) The National Law Journal 01/17/94
Lockheed Martin --Martin Marietta Defense Part of $5,874,000 Settlement, 12/23/1994Allegations of "wrongdoing associated with foreign military sales of radar systems to Egypt ... ." (Civil) Taxpayers Against Fraud (TAF) Press Release 12/23/94
Lockheed Martin Environment Pending, 8/14/1996"Residents and property owners [in Burbank, CA] seeking to recover damages for nuisance arising from environmental remediation efforts at the site of massive toxic contamination ... ." Hook v Lockheed Martin, Docket #96-CV-5584, US DC CD CA (Western Division) (Civil) Gancedo & Nieves Law Firm case description, downloaded 07/20/01; Court Docket
Lockheed Martin Defense Pending, 12/14/1995 (shades of Deepwater)" accusing Lockheed Martin Corp. of deliberately inflating the cost of equipment it sold to the US Air Force" United States v Lockheed Martin, Docket #95-CV-1287, US DC MD FL (Civil) Reuters 09/29/01; Court Docket
Lockheed Martin --Martin Marietta Environment Part of $12,145,000 Superfund Cleanup Costs, 11/23/1999Regarding "cleanup of the Pine Street Canal Superfund Site in Burlington, Vermont." United States v Green Mountain Power, Docket #99-CV-366, US DC VT (Civil) EPA Press Release 11/23/99; Confirmed by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 2 on 05/02/01
Lockheed Martin Environment Pending, 8/1/1997"... groundwater contamination class complaint ... ." Carillo v Lockheed Martin, Docket #RCV31496, Superior Court (Court of Appeal, 4th District, Division Two, California) (Civil) Mass Tort Litigation Reporter August 1997; Court Docket; Confirmed by Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack Law Firm on 05/01/01;
Lockheed Martin Defense Part of $3,150,000 Settlement, 3/26/1998Allegations "that Unisys sold spare parts at inflated prices for the NEXRAD Doppler Radar System. Lockheed Martin succeeded Unisys on the contract ... ." (Civil) Department of Justice (DOJ) Press Release 03/26/98
Lockheed Martin Labor Sealed Case Settlement, 5/7/1998"Workers in an Alabama foundry incurred a potentially deadly lung disease because manufacturers of a mask used to trap dust particles [allegedly] did not properly test the device ... ." (Civil) Houston Chronicle 05/08/98; Confirmed by Watts & Heard Law Firm on 04/12/01
Lockheed Martin --Energy Systems Environment Pending, 6/23/1998"Plaintiffs who own property near the ... complex ... [are] alleging that radioactive and chemical wastes are being discharged into the environment due to the negligence of the defendants." Adkins v Divested Atomic, Docket #98-CV-595, US DC SD OH (Civil) Hazardous Waste Litigation Reporter 07/28/98; Court Docket; Confirmed by Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley Law Firm on 06/22/01
Lockheed Martin Financial Pending, 1/14/1999Allegedly "inflated the companys stock price by makin false and misleading statements about Lockheeds operations and earnings." Yousefi v Lockheed Martin, Docket #99-CV-372, US DC CD CA (Civil) Court Docket; Stull, Stull & Brody Law Firm Press Release 06/18/99
Lockheed Martin Financial Pending, 2/11/1999"The Complaint alleges that Lockheed violated the securities laws by misrepresenting how the Company had reached its 3rd Quarter 1998 EPS targets ... by utilizing a secret accounting adjustment ... ." Kretchmeyer v Lockheed Martin, Docket #99-CV-1476, US DC CD CA (Civil) Court Docket; Wolf, Haldenstein, Adler, Freeman & Herz Press Release 02/11/99; Confirmed by Wolf, Haldenstein Law Firm on 05/11/01
Lockheed Martin Financial Pending, 7/15/1999"The Complaint alleges that ... Lockheeds insiders reinitiated a ... [misleading] publicity campaign ... to boost its stock price throughout 1999." Kensington Cap v Lockheed Martin, Docket #99-CV-7249, US DC WD CA (Civil) Court Docket; Wolf, Haldenstein Law Firm Press Release 07/15/99; Confirmed by Wolf, Haldenstein Law Firm on 05/11/01
Lockheed Martin Defense Pending, 5/30/1995" alleged that Lockheed Martin program management purposely hid $40 million reserve in order to create additional profit which could be used to offset overruns on another contract." United States v Lockheed Martin, Docket #95-CV-549 & Docket #95-CV-1287, US DC MD FL (Civil) Department of Justice (DOJ) Press Release 09/28/01; Court Docket

DeepWater Doo Doo

Shortly after 9/11/2001 the defense industry went on a feeding frenzy. This blog is about one of those feeding frenzies that track from the lead up for the projects, the lobbying to funding, the abuse of the procurement procedures, the exhaustive measures the contractors went through to fleece the government for the maximum amount, the steps and efforts that went in the side stepping oversight, and even how classified information was actually provided to foreign adversaries due to pathetic government malfeasance and contractor cover-ups and corruption.

This blog will discuss how the Coast Guard leadership knowingly put the lives of thier suordinates at risk, damaged national security, actively obstructed Congressional investigations, plied political favors and spin control, and ultimately how they tried to control the blogosphere with more Coast Guard public relations people then they had actual boast designers and TEMPEST people.

Welcome to my blog,

James M. Atkinson
http://www.tscm.com/